论文标题:基于激励相容的煤矿安全规则研究
论文作者
论文导师 肖兴志,论文学位 硕士,论文专业 产业经济学
论文单位 东北财经大学,点击次数 608,论文页数 53页File Size2886K
论文网 http://www.lw23.com/lunwen_1353097/
Coal mine accidents;; Incentive compatibility;; Safety supervision;; Game;; Conduct Options
近年来，中国煤矿事故频繁发生，并且在国家屡次严厉整顿下依然得不到遏制，目前已经成为中国构建和谐社会和实现社会可持续发展的瓶颈，也是公共政策部门以及相关学术界关注的重点问题之一。就目前的研究情况而言，国内学者从不同视角分析了煤矿安全事故发生原因，但普遍是在中国煤矿监管链条中的局部环节展开，还没有形成一个完整的分析链条。本文试图建立一个完整的分析链条来解释事故发生的原因，目的是增进人们对现实情况的理解，进而为避免煤矿事故发生提供一种可选的思路。 由于中国煤矿事故背后有着一条涉及三个层次的监管链条，包括中央政府、地方政府、煤矿企业、矿工四个利益主体，三个层次分别为中央政府一地方政府，地方政府一煤矿企业，煤矿企业一煤矿工人。由于各个利益主体有着不同的利益诉求，各个主体之间的博弈必然会对煤矿安全政策的最终效果产生一定的影响，而其中任何局部环节的博弈分析还不能系统准确地解释中国煤矿事故频发的本质原因，必须从中国整个煤矿监管链条出发才能寻求到合适的治理之路。因此，本文采用博弈的方法来研究中国煤矿事故频繁发生的问题，即从博弈论的视角出发，基于中央政府、地方政府、煤矿企业、矿工四个博弈主体的利益考虑，通过中央政府与地方政府、地方政府与煤矿企业、煤矿企业与矿工之间三组博弈的分析解释，挖掘深层次的事故发生原因。 本文在分析矿难产生原因的基础上，使用激励相容的理论建立了与博弈分析相对应的三组激励相容模型对三个层次做了更进一步的分析。从理论上讲，构建科学有效的制度机制，关键是要处理好信息有效性和激励相容问题，中国煤矿事故发生的原因很大程度上在于改革的制度设计没有处理好激励相容的问题，构建适合中国国情的煤矿安全规制体制的关键是重建共容利益，建立起可以激励政府的政治激励机制、可以激励煤矿企业提高安全设施的制度以及可以激励矿工认真培训的制度。随着激励相容制度的建立，中央政府、地方政府、煤矿企业和矿工这四个利益主体在新制度的框架下追求自己的利益，会同时促进社会目标的实现。概括而言，本文是在寻找到煤矿事故发生的根本原因的基础上，在各个层次上引入激励机制，利用激励相容使各个主体之间的利益趋于一致。 本文分析表明，对于中国目前的煤矿规制效果而言，负激励是一种更为有利、更为持久的激励方式，因此，在前两个层次应加大中央政府对地方政府煤矿安全监管的力度、地方政府对煤矿企业的监管的力度与惩罚力度，这也是中央政府与地方政府、地方政府与煤矿企业签订契约能够有效的必要条件，即保证委托人执行严厉的处罚的威胁是可信的。但为使规制效果显著化，还应同时配以一些正的激励方式，着力解决中央政府与地方政府、地方政府与煤矿企业之间的利益分享问题，从负激励和正激励两方面促使地方政府和煤矿企业能够真正落实中央政府和地方政府所规定的煤矿安全政策。同时，在第三个层次中应引入绩效工资的激励机制，做好矿工的预防性安全管理，强化矿工的安全观念，使煤矿生产达到安全生产的客观要求。
In recent years, frequent coal-mine accidents, which still not ceased under the repeated harsh rectifying, have become the bottleneck of China"s construction of harmonious society and the realization of sustaining social and economic progress, received wide attention from the public sector and related academia. According to current research on this case, domestic scholars have researched the reason from different aspects, while largely in local links of the regulation chain but lack of a complete analysis. This paper attempts to establish a complete chain of analysis to explain the reasons for the accidents, in order to enhance people"s understanding of the reality and moreover to provide a selectable idea to avoid further incidents occurred. There is a supervising chain which referred three levels hidden the China coal-mine accidents, including four benefit entities, which are the central government, local governments, coal-mine enterprises and coal-miners, and the three levels are central government - local government, local government -coal-mine enterprises, coal-mine enterprises - mines. For every entity has different benefit demand, so this paper researched the reason through Game Theory. At the same time, it"s impossible to explain the cause of China"s coal-mine accidents accurately in any local chain Game analysis system, as all the entities" Game will affect the eventual effect of coal-mine safety policy. For seeking an appropriate treatment to the coal mine, China must control the whole regulation chain. So this paper investigates from the aspect of the Game theory, based on the benefit among the central government, local governments, coal-mine enterprises and coal-miners from the aspect of Game theory and establishes three groups of game models. At the meantime, for the Game between entities must affects the final effect of the coal-mine safety policy, any partial Game analysis couldn"t systemically and exactly explain the essential reason why China coal-mine accidents occurred repeatedly, it"s necessary to seek a suitable management from the supervisory chain of China coal-mine. Based on the analysis of accident causes, this paper does a further analysis through the establishment of three-group incentive compatibility models according to the theory of incentive compatibility, corresponding to the Game of the three groups. In theory, the key to handle the effectiveness of information and incentive compatibility issues properly is constructing scientific and effective system mechanisms, China"s coal mine accidents occurred because of the design of fundamental reform institution has not handled the incentive compatibility issues. So the key to build coal-mine safety regulation system that suitable to the national conditions is reconstructing total capacity interests, including the political incentive mechanism for the governments, encourage coal enterprises to improve the safety facilities and encourage coal-miners to be trained serious system. With the establishment of Incentive compatible system, central government, local governments, mine enterprises and coal-miners will pursuit their own benefit in the framework of the new system, and also promote the realization of social objectives. Generally speaking, on a the basis of finding out the root causes of the coal mines accident, incentive mechanism is introduced to all levels, making use of incentive compatibility between the various benefits of the entities tending to be on the line. This article"s analysis indicated that negative incentive is more favorable and more lasting way for the effect of China"s current coal Regulation. Therefore, in the first two levels, it should strengthen the coal mine safety supervision of central government to local governments, and the penalties of local governments to coal enterprises, this is the necessary conditions for signing an effective contracts between central government and local governments, local governments and the coal enterprises, which means principal implement the threat of severe punishment is credible. However, for making the effect of regulation significantly, it also being supported by some positive incentive forms to resolve the issue of benefit sharing between central government and local governments, local governments and coal mine enterprises, from being negative incentives and positive incentives to promote local governments and coal enterprises to truly implement the mine safety policy that the central government and local governments ordered. Meanwhile, it should introduce incentive mechanisms of achievement in wages on the third level, strengthen the coal- miners" preventive security management and the security concepts, and make the coal mine production safety in production reach to the objective requirements.
|
