论文标题:基于公司治理的国有公司内部控制研究
A Study of State-owned Corporates" Internal Control on the Basis of Corporate Governance
论文作者
论文导师 吕有晨,论文学位 硕士,论文专业 企业管理
论文单位 吉林大学,点击次数 116,论文页数 56页File Size1330K
2007-11-12论文网 http://www.lw23.com/lunwen_142953182/
本文主要借鉴了会计学、经济学、管理学等学科的相关理论,以公司治理为基点来研究我国的内部控制问题。首先在阐述公司治理与内部控制相关理论的基础上,分析了内部控制和公司治理的关系,从而在理论层面得出以公司治理为基点研究内部控制的意义;进而分析了我国国有公司公司治理的特点以及由此造成的对内部控制的影响,从而提出完善我国国有公司公司治理,改善内部控制现状的建议。主要得出了以下结论:第一,公司治理与内部控制具有本质的区别和密切的联系。两者互为前提,相互影响,相互促进,既相互交叉,又各有侧重。第二,我国国有公司法人治理结构具有股权结构的先天缺陷、运行机制的后天不良和外部环境的极度不佳三大问题,由此给国有公司的内部控制带来三大弊端:内控建设动力不足、内控范围覆盖不全、内控目标定位不高。可见,完善国有公司法人治理结构不论是对对法人治理结构本身还是对内部控制建设都有着重要意义。第三,从理论和实务角度提出了基于公司治理的国有公司内部控制完善的具体措施,在理论上,通过扩展内部控制的内涵实现公司治理与内部控制的对接,在实务上应分别从国有公司的股权结构、董事会、监事会以及建立反向制衡机制等几个方面从公司治理角度对国有公司内部控制进行完善。
By analyzing the relation between corporate governance and internal control ,features of corporate governance and these features’effect on state-owned company’s internal control, this paper puts forward material measures based on corporate governance. Corporate governance is a concept with excessive angles, in narrow sense, it is a supervision and restriction mechanism that shareholder throw on manager, in broad sense, it includes not only shareholder’s restriction on manager, but also Stakeholders, including shareholders, creditors, providers, employees, government and community et.. Internal control’s concept experiences five phases, which is internal diversion, internal control system, internal control structure, internal control frame and risk management frame. Internal control’s genius is to build an effective control system, which aims to remedy contract’s faultiness. Corporate governance and internal control also belong to system arrangement, which ensures company’s function in gear, they not only have consanguineous relation, but also have qualitative difference, their final aim is consistent, namely, ensuring firm’s goal. In state-owned companies, corporate governance have three problems, which are equity structure’s inborn bug, function mechanism’s postnatal badness and exterior circumstance’s s curviness. Equity structure’s inborn bug embodies two sides, first , equity structure’s illogical, state-owned shareholders’excessive function and other shareholders’minuteness function; second, possessive’s ambiguity of state-owned shareholders, client-agent relation’s complexity. Function mechanism’s postnatal badness embodies three sides: first, internal person’s control, excessive duty consumption, information report’s abnormity, short-eyes’action et al., second, incentive and restriction’s soft; third, new sanhui’s conflict with intrinsic sanhui. Exterior circumstance’s s curviness embodies that corporate governance’s incomplete legal system, exterior governance mechanism’s agenesis and manager market’s juvenility. Corporate governance’s deficiency of state-owned companies brings three abuses to its internal control, namely, shortage of construction, low goal orientation and finity of internal control’s coverage. Shortage of construction is attributed to shortage of exterior need, incentive and punish measures. Low goal orientation embodies that goal is excessively easy and risk control’s shortage. So, it can be concluded that perfect corporate governance has important meaning to the construction of internal control and itself. From this point, corporate governance and internal control must be connected in theory, and corporate governance must be impended practically. The connection of corporate governance and internal control is not only the essential approach for improving internal control’s effect, but also the instrument of improving internal control’s efficiency. Indeed, reality makes it possible to realize the connection. Extending internal control’s connotation, ulteriorly sorting internal control to governance control, management control and task control; at the point of governance control, combing corporate governance’design and internal control’s mechanism can realize their connection in the abstract. From angle of reality, corporate governance can be consummated from aspects of state-owned company’s equity structure, directorate, supervision , restriction mechanism et al. Reform of state-owned company’s equity structure can be actualized through receding shareholder’s equity and developing extensive investment institution. Directorate’s core status should be established in internal control. In traditional opinion, internal control is CEO’s duty. This paper agrees that governance control is the uppermost level of internal control, proving insurance for directorate’s core status from the point of corporate governance mechanism is helpful for governance’s effect. It is because that directorate is the bridge linking shareholder and manager, which provides rational guarantee for the contract between them. Establishing directorate’s core status needs to impending its construction mechanism, mutilating shareholder’s relation with manager, reinforcing professional committees, intensifying directorate’s risk management duty, consummating independent director system. Exerting supervision committee’s effect on internal control, it needs to impending its constitutes, innovating its duty, reinforcing its responsibility. Establishing reverse restriction system from top to bottom, is not only the inevitable choice of internal control, but also its original idea. The significance of this paper, by analyzing corporate governance’s Problem and its effect on internalcontrol, is putting forward material measures so as to perfect corporate governance of Chinese company, its conclusion has definite directing value to corporate governance’s reform and internal control’s perfect in Chinese state-owned companies.
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