论文标题:大股东控制、外部审计与盈余信息含量
Large Shareholders Controlling, Independent Auditing and the Informativeness of Accounting Earnings
论文作者
论文导师 陈少华,论文学位 硕士,论文专业 会计学
论文单位 厦门大学,点击次数 150,论文页数 66页File Size1280K
2007-04-01论文网 http://www.lw23.com/lunwen_179183687/
Ecology of corporate governance;; Substantial owner;; Cash flow right to voting right ratio
公司是属于谁的?公司是所有者的公司,还是控制者的公司?正确回答这个问题并不容易。众所周知,控制权来自于所有权,比如说实际控制人通过控制链条掌握着公司的决策,而那些不是来自于所有权的控制权往往是不稳定的,比如说由于所有者缺位形成的“内部人控制”现象。人们通常认为设置了董事会独立性制度就会出现董事遵守“监管责任”,或者受审计质量“高”的国际“四大”所审计的公司的报表可靠性会高于国内会计师事务所审计的公司的。然而,如果一家公司存在控股股东,他与外部监督力量——外部审计、独立董事——之间的关系,决不是简单的互补或者是替代作用,也不是人们通常所认为的线性关系。 种种的争论表明,公司治理制度没有明确的好坏之分,在公司治理利益链条中也不存在“强者恒强”这样的角色。因此,如果资本市场是有效的,那么这些角色力量的强弱、制度的合理性最终都可以在市场上被反映出来。 本文基于对相关文献的回顾以及对数据的分析,推导出目前我国上市公司股权结构的主要问题在于大股东控制,即大股东与中小股东的利益之争。同时,研究发现大股东可以通过金字塔持股,以较小的资金投入,换取较大的控制权,即现金流量权和投票权分离的情况是存在的,且这一现象还相当普遍,这使得大股东具有通过操纵管理层损害公司利益的动机。 在资本市场是有效的这一前提下,根据影响盈余反应系数的两个因素——收益的稳定性和收益的噪音,辅之以股价的稳定性,可以推断出:短期来看,投资者对不同股权结构的公司的会计盈余拥有先验的反应;长期来看,控股股东的持股动机会影响到收益的稳定性,而外部审计的审计质量和董事会的独立性会影响收益的真实性。 因此,本文使用收益——回报模型,对考虑了股权结构、外部监督力量的盈余回报关系进行检验。检验结果表明,当控股股东持股比例在45%左右时,该类上市公司短时窗的会计盈余信息含量最低;分离程度高的公司,长时窗检验的盈余反应系数会下降。此外,研究还发现,在我国特殊的法律环境下,国内十大的审计质量并没有预期的那样好,而且董事会独立性有待克服其形式化的问题。
Whose is the company? Is it the shareholders’, or is it the controllers’? It is not a question easily to answer. As everyone knows, voting rights comes from cash flow rights, such as the substantial owners firmly control the decision of the listed companies through controlling chain. Moreover controlling right that is not based on cash flow right is inconstant. For example, the internal controller caused by the missing of owners is always instant. We always preconceive that independent directors of a company would be more trustable, and the financial reports audited by Big4 will be credible than audited by other CPA firms’. However, the relationship between the big investors and outside supervisors--independent auditors and independent directors, can not be simply complemented or substituted. Furthermore, it may be not linear as people usually think about it. Evidences indicate that it is hard to choose one kind of corporate governance institution that is much better than the others, and there are not constant controllers in the chain of corporate governance. So if the capital market is effect, the power of different forces and the reasonability of the institution will be reflected by the stock prices. This study based on the summary of relative literatures and the analysis of data, deduces that the main problem of ownership structure in listed companies is large investor controlling, always referred as the conflict between the investors. Meanwhile, we found that the big investors own large voting rights with little investment by pyramid structures or cross-holdings. It means that the large shareholder have the motive to tunneling by control the administrant. If the capital market is effect, based on the two main factors--the stability of earnings and the noise of earnings signal--influence the Earning Response Coefficient(ERC), accompanying with the stock price stability, we can deduce that different ownership structure will contribute different apriority reflections for earnings in short time, the motive of substantial owners will effect the stability of earnings, and the independence of outside supervisors will influence the noise of earnings signal. This study examines the relations among earnings informativeness, measured by the earnings--return relation, the ownership structure and the outside supervisors of listed companies in China. I found concentrated ownership with 45% voting right will get a lowest ERC, and that the higher the divergence rate between cash flow right and voting right, the lower the ERC. Otherwise, the top-10 CPA firms do not result in high auditing quality as prospected, and the independence of directors would not effect.
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