论文标题:我国上市公司独立董事制度的功能研究
The Research on Function of the Independent Director Systems to the Listed Companies in China.
论文作者
论文导师 王国顺,论文学位 博士,论文专业 管理科学与工程
论文单位 中南大学,点击次数 139,论文页数 139页File Size7526K
2006-01-01论文网 http://www.lw23.com/lunwen_228518117/
independent director system;compatibilities risk;function;corporate governance
自20世纪90年代以来，独立董事制度已经成为被众多国家广泛采纳的作为完善公司治理结构的一项重要举措，我国也于2001年在上市公司中全面引入了独立董事制度。现在，独立董事制度已经成为了现代公司治理的一个重要组成部分，对其进行深入研究具有非常重要的研究价值。 在笔者所及文献，国内对于我国上市公司独立董事制度的功能进行全面分析的文献非常缺乏。本文从独立董事制度的功能研究角度切入独立董事制度进行了系统深入研究，为推动我国独立董事制度和公司治理的完善提供理论支持。 本文全文主要是围绕以下几个问题来展开研究：第一个问题是我国上市公司治理存在哪些主要问题?第二个问题是独立董事制度在公司治理中理论上究竟可以拥有哪些功能?第三个问题是独立董事制度功能发挥的需要满足哪些条件?第四个问题是我国上市公司独立董事制度是否影响了公司业绩?第五个问题是我国上市公司独立董事制度功能发挥的现实条件如何?第六个问题是怎样完善我国上市公司独立董事制度，以使其功能得到充分发挥。 对第一个问题的回答，我们明确将我国上市公司治理存在的各种纷繁复杂主要问题系统归纳提炼为三类相容性风险问题，为全文对独立董事制度三个主要功能的深入系统分析树立了靶心，三类“相容性”问题分别是：(1)委托层股东利益不一致而引起的股东相容性问题；(2)委托—代理的激励相容性风险问题；(3)代理人能力与公司发展要求的相容性问题。并指出，第一、二类为利益和动机问题，第三类是认识和能力问题，这三类不同性质的“相容性”问题共同影响着上市公司的治理风险。目前，业界在研究上市公司治理风险问题时多带有较大片面性，缺乏通盘考虑，对第二类风险问题关注得较多，而对第一、三类风险问题关注得特别少，这不利于上市公司的治理风险防范。 对第二个问题的回答，我们认为，独立董事制度理论上的三个主要功能，(1)独立董事因为具有独立性，独立于大股东，通过独立董事运行的某些特定条款等等，可以限制大股东将其非经济理性的行为渗透到上市公司中来，从而协调股东利益不一致而引起的股东相容性矛盾；(2)独立董事在一定程度上是所有者的代表，独立于经营者，
Since the 90"s of 20 centuries, as an important measure and action, the independent director system has been widely adopted by many countries to improve corporate governance. From 2001 the independent director system has also been completely introduced in China. Now this system has become an important part of the modern corporate governance, so it"s very valuable for us to study it profoundly.At the present time, the domestic research on function of our independent director system in listed companies is so rare. This thesis studied independent director system from the function angle and offer certain proof and some suggestion for pushing the perfection of the independent director system and corporate governance in listed companies forward in China.This text proceeded to the research according to the following problems: The first one is which key corporate governance problems exist in the listed companies in China.The second one is which functions independent director system can own theoretically in corporate governance. The third one is which terms should be satisfied if the independent director system is wanted to give full play its functions in the listed companies in China. The fourth one is to analyse if the independent director system influenced the listed companies performance or not in China. The fifth one is what is the actual terms. The sixth one is how to perfect the independent director systems in the listed companies in China.To answer the first question, we managed to refine clearly and definitely the kinds of numerous and complicated key corporate governance problems in our share limited liability companies to the three compatibilities risk problems which affect the corporate governance risk together. The three compatibilities are, (1) the disagreement of shareholders interest lead to compatibilities of the share holders;(2) the invigorative compatibilities risk problems of principal-agency; (3)the compatibilities problems between the ability of agency and the requirement of the development of companies.After researching , we point out that the first and second compatibilities risk problem belong to benefits or motive problems, while the third one belongs to cognition or ability problem.. At the present, there is a serious disadvantage in studying corporate governance problems that people lacked to consider them as a whole, paid attention to the second one more, but to the next two specially little.
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