论文标题:资本市场开放与国有股减持
Analysis of the Problems from the Emergence to the Development for the Middle-sized & Small-sized Technical Enterprises
论文作者 吴忠炜
论文导师 储祥银,论文学位 硕士,论文专业 国际贸易
论文单位 对外经济贸易大学,点击次数 386,论文页数 41页File Size1362k
2002-04-01论文网 http://www.lw23.com/lunwen_2960057/ 委托代理问题; 公司治理结构 ;国有股减持; 资本市场; 合格外国机构投资者
Six Sigma quality management,Service quality,Process,Continuously improvement
本文从股票的内在价值入手，说明股票的价格围绕其内在价值上下波动。上市公司的未来分红现金流决定股票的内在价值。而公司分红的根本在于公司经营活动产生的盈利。公司追求股价最大化或者追求利润最大化本质上是一致的。物质资本的可抵押性决定了在一般情况下，物质资本的所有者掌握企业的“剩余索取权”。由于物质资本的所有者往往不具备管理公司取得最大利润的能力，出现了经理人阶层。公司的管理中产生了“委托-代理问题”。为了使公司能达到自身的目标，要求公司的“剩余索取权”和“剩余控制权”要有对应安排。公司治理结构起到重要作用。在中国，国有股份的所有权是由政府代为行使的。政府作为社会的管理者，其目标是和企业利润最大化的目标不一致的。而且，更重要的是，政府不能既当“运动员”，又当“裁判员”，否则容易出现行政权利的“寻租”，造成腐败。改革过程中的政企分开，放权让利，使得政府对企业的控制分散到地方和部委，进而在很大程度上失控。国有股权的所有者缺位，造成了两个问题，一是经营者的“内部人控制”，二是经营者通过国有大股东的控股权（国有股一股独大）对小股东权益进行侵害。减持国有股应该站在改善公司治理结构的高度。引进国外投资者对于填补减持所需的资金缺口和引入所有者约束都有积极意义。市场化的定价方案符合经济规律，使每个人都有参与的权利。通过国际比较，“合格外国机构投资者”制度应该是吸引外资参与减持的有效方案。将国有股权形成减持基金分批发售，是灵活稳妥的方法。
ABSTRACTWith the globalization of the capital market, China is increasingly involved in the world finance system. The operation of listing companies and capital market situations are what the international institutional investors concerned and listing companies with independent supervision systems are welcomed.In China, for systems reasons the "Majority Shareholders Controlling" and "Insiders Controls "phenomena exist in most of listing companies. The controlling shareholders seize and inside executives and directors swindle assets from the listing companies thus leave the listing companies emptied of assets and consequently impair the interests of minorities. At the same time, the board of supervisors governed by the insiders can"t play an active role in the supervision system. As the basic force in the market, the large-numbered majorities should be protected to have the normal of this market to be established. Thus, corporate governance in China should aims at two subjects as enforcement of the supervision over the majority as well as supervision over the insiders. For the aforesaid reasons, the CSRC (China Securities Regulatory Commission) issued provisions regarding the introduction of independent directors into listing companies. This rises the discussions as to independent directors among scholars and practitioners and various opinions emerged. It is under this background that this paper is presented. By theoretical and empirical methods, this paper refers to the research products of developed countries, and concludes by personal constructive suggestions.This paper begins with a share-holding structures comparison between China and U.S., inducing the subjective of corporate supervision in China, then indicts the independent directors as an instrument that can be used for reference. Secondly after a detailed analysis concerning the concept of independent directors, this paper states the significance for China to introduce independent directors. Furthermore this paper enumerates the obstacles for the establishment of this instrument, esp. in the aspect of its concessions with board of supervisors within one company, and concludes with solutions to that. I must say thanks to many people, especially my tutor, Dean Prof. Shen Sibao, gave me so much valuable instructions though busy with his work. His extensive knowledge, serious attitudes for study and respected personality will surely benefit me lot. Confined by my knowledge, research ability and time limited, what I have presented in this paper is far from completeness and perfection. I will be appreciative of good ideas for my superficial conclusions.
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