论文标题:国有金融体制变迁中的信贷配给问题分析——对金融控制和商业化改革的再思考
Study and Simulation of Control and Guidance system of Spinning Maneuver Warhead with Variable-Centroid
论文作者 古文威
论文导师 张静琦,论文学位 硕士,论文专业 金融学
论文单位 西南财经大学,点击次数 220,论文页数 60页File Size2652k
2000-05-01论文网 http://www.lw23.com/lunwen_4074317/ 证券市场 买壳上市
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国有金融体制改革的核心问题有二：一是从完善宏观调控的角度对中央银行的改造；二是国有银行的商业化改革。但是，尽管二十多年来的金融改革取得了很大的成效，当前却在很大程度上陷入一种僵局，如何实现改革的深化并使之富有实效已成为困扰理论界和实务界的难题。作为本文的主旨，试图从一个方面——信贷配给的角度上对金融控制和商业化改革进行思考，并在此基础上对构建我国信贷市场运行机制做出初步的理论探索。 与我们熟悉的信贷规模管理有所不同，在西方经济学理论中，信贷配给定义为：贷款人不是完全依靠利率机制而往往附加各种贷款条件，通过配给的方式来实现信贷交易的达成。在这里，根据配给的不同成因可区分为两种不同的信贷配给形式，一是中央银行的信贷配给，如规模控制、利率管制等，这是政府出于对经济的各种管制而推行的；二是商业银行在信贷市场上的配给行为，产生原因是缘于现实经济中的信息不对称问题。正是由于它定义所包含的双重内容，因此，对它的分析涉及到国家（中央银行）——商业银行——企业这三层关系，通过从考察我国信贷配给的历史、现状及其发展趋势入手，为审视我国金融控制和商业化改革的历史和出路提供了线索和思路。 本文的写作思路是以信贷配给作为贯穿全文的主线，对金融控制和国有银行商业化改革进行探索。首先，通过对国有金融体制变迁的简要描述，说明既往改革成功和当前改革停滞的根源，从而初步论证了金融改革的下一步取向，说明为什么能通过对信贷配给的分析为我国金融改革提供思路；然后，分别从中央银行信贷配给和国有商业银行信贷配给这两条线索出发，对金融控制和国有银行商业化改革进行反思和探讨；最后，通过介绍现代西方信贷配给理论及与金融深化理论的比较，并综合全文各章节的分析和结论，对构建我国信贷市场运行机制进行理论思考，这也 是对全文所论证的金融改革取向的总结。 本文共分四章，各章主要内容及结论如下： 第一章 导论：国有金融体制变迁与信贷配给演进 本章以新制度经济学为基本理论框架，首先对国有金融体制 变迁原因及其过程进行了简要描述，认为经济体制改革以来国有 金融体制变迁基本上可说是一种政府主导的混合型制度变迁方 式，其变迁过程是与金融利益主体追求自身效用最大化的过程紧 密联系的，从国家的理性假定出发，可以很容易理解改革过程中 国有金融体制的迅速扩张。国有金融体制改革一开始就表现为政 府自上而下的推动，是作为国家财政的制度替代而存在的，这种 制度替代既是以往改革成功的关键，又是当前改革停滞的根源。 由于在经济金融体制改革以来逐渐形成的国家、国有企业和国有 银行之间的三重“隐合约” 的刚性依赖关系，既使得国家目前不 得不继续支付更大的成本进行金融控制，也使得商业化改革陷入 了公共选择理论中的“一致同意陷附＼ 对于国有银行下一步改革 的取向，针对当前流行的观点——一认为要对国有银行进行产权重 新界定，进行股份制改造，笔者认为，产权改革必须调整既有的 利益结构，由于“隐合约”的存在，决定其界定成本业己非常高 昂，回旋余地狭窄，因而难以真正启动。要推进金融改革，必须 突破隐合约制约，其焦点在于重塑银企关系，建立市场关系，将 政府行为间的“交易”转换成产权主体间的交易行为，即通过金 融交易推动金融改制。由于金融交易的核心是信贷交易，因此， 考查我国中央银行和国有商业银行的信贷配给问题，进而重新审 视金融控制和商业化改革的历史和发展，并由此结合我国的实际， 构筑起适应社会主义市场经济条件的信贷市场运行机制，具有了 极强的现实意义。 第二章 我国中央银行信贷配给分析 本章首先继续在制度经济学框架下，分析了我国中央银行信 贷配给的主要形态—一信贷规模控制的历次演进过程及其特征， 提示了其内涵的金融制度变迁的理论过程。在其基础上，利用博 2 奔论原理，研究了一直在我国宏观调控手段中占主导地位的信贷 规模管理下的国有银行（在地方政府介入下）的行为特征，并进 一步阐述了中央银行信贷配给的效率和损失。作为本章的结论， 对国有银行制度变迁和国家金融控制进行了总结，认为经济改革 来国民收入分配格局的变化和储蓄投资主体的分离及“弱财政、 强金融”格局的形成这两个因素是既往金融体制改革的深层原因， 只要在‘旧 财政” 的条件下，国有银行的公有金融产权就难以界 定清晰，从而国家的金融控制就有充分的理由，在金融改革中单 纯考虑国家退出也就过于简单?
There are two key questions about financial institutional reforms:the re-construction of central bank"s functions and thecommercialization of state-owned banks (SOBs). But, undoubtedly,both of these kinds of reforms have been in dilemma by now. As theaim of this paper, the author tries to look fOr some answers to how tocarry on reforms of financial control of central bank andcommercialization of SOB," not from the whole, but from one side:the credit rationing.Different from the loan scale administration which is often usedin the developing countries, in western econoniic theories, creditrationing is divided into two types: first, the loan administration ofcentral bank, such as scale control, interest rate administration, etc;second, the loan rationing of commercial banks in loan market, which.is caused by the asymmetric infOrmation in real economy. Owing tothese two types of its content, the analyses of Chinese credit rationingprovide clues to Chinese financial control and commercial reforms ofSOB,"This paper is consisted of four chapters as following:The first chapter is a guide to this paper. At the beginning, theauthor gives a brief explanation of the cause and procedure of Chinesestated-owned financial institutional transfer, pointing out the reasonthat led to the dilemma of financial reforms. The author thinks the keyto next step of Chinese financial reforms is to re-construct therelationship between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and SOBs, whichmeans China must set up the market transactions between SOE, andSOBs instead of the transactions by the willingness of governmentnowadays.1 Thesntralbhineselthof，f；an scalLe lati口eakeneLIS“ICS：ale adlThe second chapter analyses the credit rationing of Chinesecentral bank. Firstly, the author explains the cause of several stages ofChinese central bank"s credit rationing. On the basis of that, theauthor, using the game theory, studies the SOB"s characteristics underloan scale administration .The central bank is rationing credit throughthe national credit plan, its "leakage" is very huge, so its effects areweakened. At the same time, in the "gray" credit market brought bythis "leakage", the central bank loses its full effectiveness to loanscale administration. This provides a chance for China to establish anew credit rationing mechanism. One key point in that is the legal.environment should be improved. But from another side, because ofthe weak national finance and it"s too difficult to make the publicproprieties distinct by now, the Chinese government has to go onassuming the obligation of controlling finance though its cost ishigher and higher, so, it is too ideal just to ask the State abandon thecontrol from financial fields.The third chapter gives analysis of credit rationing of SOBs.Since Chinese economic reforms, the interdependent relationshipsamong the State, SOEs and SOB,, which is often called the" explicittri-contract relationships", have come into being gradually, suchresults in SOB"s variety which acts through the "gray" financialmarket, especially" the gray financiaI markets within system" whenSOB, ration the loan. But the author thinks, such variety is effectivesomehow from the view of institutional transfer because it maybe leadto financial institutional innovation. Owing to the radical change inChinese economic structure, the way to carry on SOB"s reform lies inthe transactions between SOBs and non-state owned economic unitiesby market rules.This chapter also emphatically analyses "the unwillingness toloan of SOBs "-one important part of SOB "s credit rationing nowadays.The author owes it mainly to the asymmetric information which is..very serious in Chinese loan market. SOB"s unwil4ingness to Ioanmakes the credit rationing is of semi-equilibrium that brings about theleakage of financial effectiveness but also means th6 possibili
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