论文标题:里根政府赤字财政的交易成本政治学分析
Analysis of Reagan Government"s Deficit Finance from the Perspective of Transaction Cost Politics
论文作者 罗鹏部
论文导师 杨烨,论文学位 硕士,论文专业 马克思主义理论与思想政治教育
论文单位 华东师范大学,点击次数 192,论文页数 55页File Size2893k
2005-04-01论文网 http://www.lw23.com/lunwen_63857777/ 里根政府;赤字财政;政治经济学;交易成本政治学
Reagan government; deficit finance; political economics;transaction cost politics
里根政府在内政外交上取得巨大的成功,但是,其遗留下来的财政赤字却成为人们争议的焦点。从经济学角度来看,学者们普遍认为里根政府财政政策的结果与里根政府所奉行的经济理论和上台时的承诺是相背离的。因此,学者们得出的结论是,里根政府的财政政策是失败的。但是,本文认为,不能仅仅从里根政府财政政策所导致的巨额赤字就断定其财政政策是失败的。本文试图从新政治经济学的交易成本政治学视角对里根政府赤字财政产生的原因进行分析,并对其所产生的结果进行重新审视,从而得出与上述经济学视角不一致的结论:应该对里根政府的财政政策作出肯定的评价。 交易成本政治学理论是新制度经济学理论在政治领域的运用。交易成本政治学认为,在政治领域也存在大量的交易成本。运用交易成本政治学理论分析里根政府赤字财政形成的原因,主要有:(1)里根总统与选民之间在财政政治合同上的弱约束机制,是导致里根财政赤字的重要原因。(2)政府的财政预算过程也是政治交易的过程,是各个利益集团在公共预算中博弈的过程。在预算过程中存在利益集团与国会议员的委托代理关系,这种复杂的委托代理关系最终导致了公共资源的困境——赤字财政不可避免。 在结果评价上,交易成本政治学理论认为,不能仅仅从一个政策在短期内增加了交易成本就判断该政策是无效的。里根政府的财政政策不象宏观调控中的货币政策能够对经济的调节起到“立竿见影”的效果,财政政策作用结果的显示往往具有滞后性。因此,本文认为,应该从时间观和空间观的双重角度对里根政府财政政策的结果进行重新评价。里根政府赤字政策对20世纪80年代美国经济的复苏、对外战略的调整、社会矛盾的缓和,均具有战略性的作用。同时,也是美国20世纪90年代出现“新经济现象”的重要原因之一。
The Reagan government achieved great success in both internal and external affairs. Yet the deficit it left becomes the focus of arguments. Scholars believe that from economics standpoint, the result of Reagan government"s financial policy is in conflict with the theory he advocated and the promises he made when coming to power. Therefore, they usually regard Reagan government"s financial policy a failure. But the author believes that we cannot judge that his financial policy is unsuccessful just from the big deficit it brings. The paper attempts to analyze the reasons that lead to the deficit finance from the perspective of transaction cost politics of the neo-political economics. It also attempts to reconsider the result that Reagan government"s financial policy bring and hence comes to a conclusion that we should evaluate Reagan government"s financial policy positively.The transaction cost politics is the application of the theory of new institutional economics in the field of politics. The transaction cost politics believes that there are a variety of political transactions in the political field. All political transactions are based on political contracts with the relationships of trust and agent.The paper analyzes two reasons that lead to Reagan government"s deficit finance. On the one hand, the weak control mechanism of the financial political contract between president Reagan and his electorates is one of the important reasons that result in the financial deficit. On the other hand, the process of financial budget is the process of political transaction, and the process of playing games between various benefit groups as well. The relationships of trust and agent between benefit groups and congressmen always existed during the process of budget decision. The complicated relationships of trust and agent resulted in the plight of common resources, namely the unavoidable financial deficit.As to the evaluation of result, the transaction cost politics holds that we cannot decide that a policy is useless just because its transaction cost increases in a short period of time. Unlike the currency policy in macro-regulation, which can have immediate influence upon economy, the effect of Reagan government"s financial policy often lags behind thepolicy itself. Therefore, the author believes the effect of Reagan government"s financial policy should be reevaluated within the framework of time and space. Reagan government"s deficit policy has strategic effect on the alleviation of social conflicts, on the adjustment of strategies towards other countries, and on the regeneration of American economy in the 80th of twentieth century. It is also one of the important reasons for the coming of the neo-economy phenomenon in the 90th of twentieth century.
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