论文标题:我国股份公司监事会制度建构的法律思考
Research on Strengthening of Market Supervision and Administration of the Industry and Commercial Administration Authority
论文作者 周富强
论文导师 萧乾刚,论文学位 硕士,论文专业 经济法学
论文单位 郑州大学,点击次数 63,论文页数 62页File Size2550k
2004-05-01论文网 http://www.lw23.com/lunwen_994808742/ 股份公司;监事会制度;现状;法律完善
shareholder"s company,the system of board of censors,currentsituation,law perfection.
在企业所有者与经营者分离的现代股份公司中，股东并不直接经营或控制公司，行使公司经营职权的是董事会，其行为对股东、公司、债权人及社会公众的合法权益有着直接而重要的影响。为保护股东利益，各国立法例无不在股份公司的治理结构中设置监督机制，其中大陆法系的多数国家以及我国的公司法均在股份公司治理结构中设有专门的监督机构——监事会。然而，在现实生活中，由于观念、体制和立法等因素的影响，我国监事会制度无论在立法上还是在实践中都存在诸多问题，监事会并未在公司治理中发挥应有的监督作用，甚至产生监事会虚化现象。鉴此，本文运用法经济学、比较法学、法解释学等研究方法，从海洋法系和大陆法系公司监督模式的历史沿革、基本理论入手，探讨了我国监事会制度虚化现象产生的根源，提出了关于我国股份公司监督机构改革的思路和立法思考。 全文除前言、结论外，共分为三个部分。 第一部分，股份公司监事会制度概览。该部分分析了股份公司监事会的含义；指出分权制衡理论和代理成本理论是监事会制度的理论基础；介绍了各国关于专门监督机构的不同立法例，即德国模式、英美模式、日本模式、法国模式；阐明了选择、设计及评价监事会的原则，即权力分工制衡原则，保障董事会充分发挥积极作用的原则，保护股东及其他利害相关者利益的原则。 第二部分，我国股份公司监事会制度的现状分析。该部分指出，现行公司法监事会存在四个方面的缺陷：第一、我国监事会缺乏必要的独立性；第二、监事会的职权设置不到位；第三、缺乏必要的激励约束机制；第四、缺乏应有的监督能力和信息。究其原因，有立法规定本身的原因，还有政治、经济体制和立法环境方面的原因，更有监事会制度本身的不健全与不完善方面的原因。只有认清这些导致监事会失灵的原因，才能对症下药，通过修改立法规定等来完善监事会制度。 第三部分，我国股份公司监事会制度的法律完善。此部分是全文的核心。在本部分中，首先，作者对独立董事作了全面的评价。独立董事是在英美法系国家实行公司内部治理结构“一元制”的背景下产生的，其设置旨在解决公司内部监控机制缺位的问题。独立董事的积极作用主要表现在:第一、为公司决策提供咨询意见;第二、监督执行董事的工作;第三、作为判断经营成员工作情况的公正法官。其消极作用表现在:第一、独立董事的独立性值得怀疑;第二、独立董事的监督、决策缺乏必要的信息保障和时间保障。指出英美法的监督机制有效并非独立董事之功，而有赖于其特殊的外部环境及相应的制度保障，而这些外部环境和相应的制度保障正是我国所缺乏的。由于独立董事具有两面性，因此，我们应继续完善监事会制度，吸纳和借鉴独立董事制度的优点。其次，作者认为，应从三个方面来完善监事会制度:一是完善监事会的组织机制和任免机制;二是完善监事会的职权;三是建立对监事的激励与约束机制。再次，作者认为，股份公司的监督机制是一个内外部监督有机统一的系统，在完善监事会制度的同时，还需要完善我国股份公司的内部监督体系。事实上，内部监督体系包括四个层次:一是董事会内部的监督机制;二是监事会对董事会和经理层的监督;三是股东大会对董事会、监事会的监督;四是股东对股东大会、董事会、监事会的监督。上述四层次的监督体系既有差别，又相互协同作用，其中股东的监督更具有根本性的作用，而我国在此方面却尤为缺失，函需补充与完善。最后，作者指出，以完善我国股份公司监事会制度为主，充分吸纳和借鉴独立董事制度的优点，允许不同的公司治理结构在一国内部并存，合理进行独立董事与监事会的职能协调与职权分配，构建我国股份公司内部监督体系，强化监督制约机制。
Supervision is stipulated in the legislation of all the countries in the interests of shareholders. In most countries of the continental law system as well as in China. The board of censors is set up as the institution of supervision. But there are many problems in the system of the board of censors in the legislation and judicial practice. The board of censors hasn"t taken effect. Therefore, the author makes some suggestions on the reform of the censor system of the joint stock company from the angle of legal economics, comparative law and legal explanation. Those suggestions are that we should not introduce the system of independent directors. The paper is made up of three parts besides the introduction and the conclusion.Part I: a review of the system of board of censors of the joint stock company. In the part, the author analyses the meaning of the board of censors. The theory of the separation and restriction of power and that of the agent cost are the theoretical foundation of the system of the board of censors. There are different legal patterns: the German pattern, the Angle-American pattern, the Japanese pattern and the French pattern. There are such principles to choose, design and evaluate the board of censors as the principle of the separation and restriction of censors, the principle of the guaranteeing the positive affect of the board of directors and the principle of protection the interests of the shareholders and other related.Part II: the present situation of the system of board of censors of the joint stock company in China. In the part, the author points it out that there are four faults in the present legislation of the board of censors. Firstly, we are short of the necessary independence of the board of censors; secondly, there are faults in the power of the board of Censors; thirdly, the necessary system of encouragement and restriction is short. Fourthly, the information and ability of supervision are short. There are all kinds of reasons for the present situation: the legislation, the political and environmental system, the legal environment and the unreason ability of the system of board of censors. Only when we understand the reasons can we improve the system by improving the legislation.Part III: the improvement of the board system of censors of the joint stockcompany. The part is the core of the paper. First of all, the author evaluates the system of the independent directors. It results from the centralized management of the company in the Angle- American law system. Its goal is to solve the problem of the shortage of the censorship of the company. There are three positive effects of the independent directors: Firstly, making suggestions on the policy-making; secondly, supervising the work of the executive directors; thirdly, working as a judge to the management. The negative effects are as follows: Firstly, the independence of the independence directors deserves to be doubted; Secondly, the supervision and policy-making of the independent director are short of the necessary information and time. Because of the two sides, we should improve the system of the board of censors and use the experiences of the system of independence censors. Therefore, the author believes that the system of board of censors should be improved as follows: Firstly, the organization and appointment system of the board censors should be improved; Secondly, the power of the board of censors should be improved; thirdly, the system of encouragement and restriction on the censors should be founded. Then, the author believes that the supervision system of the joint stock company is comprehensive so that we should improve the inner supervision system as well as the outer one. In fact, the inner supervision system is composed of four parts: Firstly, the supervision system in the board of censors; Secondly, the supervision system of the board of censors on the board of directors and the management; thirdly, the supervision of the shareholders" meeting, the board of directors and the board of censors. The four-
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